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Abstract 
In order to stabilize the climate, environmentally friendly energy sources must be developed 
and improved. The theory of technological change and endogenous growth are crucial when 
it comes to dealing with the climate issue. If the improvements in technology can be 
directed to the clean energy sources, it might be possible to solve the climate problem 
without sacrificing a considerable amount of long-run growth. 
This thesis builds on the model by Acemoglu et al (2012), which is an endogenous growth 
model with directed technical change. It is a two-sector model with clean and dirty 
technologies that are improved by R&D. The model involves a social planner that can use a 
carbon tax and/or a research subsidy in order to conduct the optimal policy. I have extended 
the model into a two regions framework, where only one of the regions has environmental 
concerns. I have investigated by the use of numerical analysis if it is possible to redirect R&D 
in a multi-region world.  
This thesis concludes that it is possible to redirect R&D by using a subsidy if the 
environmental concerned region can target more than 50% of the scientists. It will also be 
possible by using only a carbon tax if the technology gap between the two sectors is not too 
large. These results suggest that if the majority of the world can agree upon a climate 
agreement, it will be sufficient to redirect the technological change towards the 
environmentally friendly energy sources, which again can solve the climate issue. 
  
IV 
 
 
V 
 
Preface 
First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor Mads Greaker at Statistics Norway 
for outstanding guidance during the writing of this thesis. His great knowledge, valuable 
feedback and inspiring enthusiasm have been invaluable.       
I would also like to thank the Oslo Centre for Research on Environmentally friendly Energy 
(CREE) for granting me a student scholarship, and Statistics Norway for providing an inspiring 
environment during the time of writing.  
Finally I want to thank my parents for their constant support and assistance in correcting, 
and my fellow students at Statistics Norway for great company this last semester. 
 
Ingrid Semb Weyer 
Oslo, May 2015  
 
 
 
 
 
  
VI 
 
 
VII 
 
Content 
1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 1 
2 Literature Overview ............................................................................................................. 4 
3 The AABH model .................................................................................................................. 6 
3.1  Directed technical change in clean and dirty technologies ............................................ 6 
3.2  Model description ........................................................................................................... 7 
3.3  Results ........................................................................................................................... 16 
3.3.1 Laissez-Faire Equilibrium ......................................................................................... 16 
3.3.2 Socially optimal allocation ...................................................................................... 16 
4 A two regions model .......................................................................................................... 20 
4.1  Model description ......................................................................................................... 20 
4.2  Equilibrium condition .................................................................................................... 24 
5 Numerical model ................................................................................................................ 25 
5.1  Model description ......................................................................................................... 25 
5.2  Results ........................................................................................................................... 27 
5.2.1 Business as usual (BAU) ........................................................................................... 27 
5.2.2 Research and development subsidy (R&D) ............................................................. 30 
5.2.3 Carbon tax ............................................................................................................... 34 
5.2.4 Optimal carbon tax when  Ac0 = 0,65 and Ac0 = 0,5 ........................................... 36 
5.2.5 Optimal policy ......................................................................................................... 37 
5.3  Discussion ...................................................................................................................... 39 
6 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 41 
References ................................................................................................................................ 43 
Appendix................................................................................................................................... 45 
 
  
VIII 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
1 Introduction 
In 1979 the first World Climate Conference took place in Geneva. The purpose was “to 
foresee and prevent potential man-made changes in climate that might be adverse to well-
being of humanity” (UNEP and UNFCCC 2002). The conference was sponsored by World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO) and led to the establishment of the World Climate 
Programme. 
In 1988 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established by the WMO 
and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The IPCC works on giving the 
world the best scientific, technical and socio-economic information relevant to climate 
change. 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was ratified in 
1992. It is an international environmental treaty whose objective is to prevent climate 
change by stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere (UNFCCC 1992). The 
agreement set no binding limits for emissions for individual countries, so it is considered 
legally non-binding.     
In 1997 the Kyoto Protocol was adopted. This protocol linked to the UNFCCC was the first 
substantial climate agreement. It commits its parties by setting “country-specific GHG 
emissions limits and a timetable for their attainment” (Perman et al, 2011, p. 334). The 
protocol places most of the responsibility on industrialized nations and sets emission targets 
for developed countries only (UNFCCC 1998). 
Today there are 192 parties to the Kyoto agreement. It is criticized for not binding 
developing countries to any emission targets, which is one of the main reasons why the US is 
not participating. From November 30th to December 11th 2015 the UN will arrange a new 
climate conference in Paris, where the goal is to achieve a new international climate 
agreement in order to keep the global warming below 2 degrees.  
The IPCC’s latest contribution The Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) that was released in four 
parts in 2013 and 2014, states that: “Human influence on the climate system is clear, and 
recent anthropogenic emissions of green-house gases are the highest in history. Recent 
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climate changes have had widespread impacts on human and natural systems” (IPCC 2014). 
The report states that in order to maintain global warming below 2 °C, the GHG emissions 
must be reduced by 40% to 70% by 2050 compared to 2010, and the emissions levels must 
be near zero in 2100.  
Climate stabilization can be costly if it means reducing long-run growth. The alternative is to 
develop energy sources that do not emit carbon dioxide to the atmosphere. Hoffert et al 
(2002) have looked at technology paths to global climate stability. They conclude that: ”A 
broad range of intensive research and development is urgently needed to produce 
technological options that can allow both climate stabilization and economic development”. 
This means that in order to stabilize the climate, environmental friendly technologies need 
to be improved. 
The technologies in the energy sector can be divided into two groups: Clean and dirty. Clean 
technologies are low-emission technologies such as solar and wind, electric cars and 
advanced biofuel, while dirty technologies are high-emission technologies such as coal 
power plants and internal combustion engines. Currently the clean technologies are at a 
disadvantage in terms of cost and quality. This thesis will look into how to cause faster 
improvements in clean technologies than in dirty technologies in a global framework where 
countries have different preferences. My research question is: Is it possible to redirect R&D 
in a multi-region world?     
This thesis is based on the model by Acemoglu, Aghion, Bursztyn and Hemous (2012), which 
from now on will be referred to as the AABH model. It is an endogenous growth model for a 
global economy. The model proposes a simple two-sector model for R&D, where research is 
divided between clean and dirty technologies. A final good is produced using the inputs 
produced by these two sectors, and the research will be directed to the most profitable 
sector.  
The AABH model looks at a global economy with a social planner, but this is not the reality in 
the world today. In this thesis I will introduce two regions, one that care for the 
environment, while the other one does not want to take the environmental issue into 
consideration just yet. I will assume that both regions are engaged in R&D, and technology 
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flows between them. The incentives to innovate depend on the aggregate market for dirty 
and clean intermediates in the two regions.  
This thesis will provide a numerical analysis of the two regions framework. It will calculate 
the optimal policy for the two regions in the business as usual situation and when there is a 
carbon tax and/or a research subsidy available. All the numerical simulations are conducted 
in Microsoft Excel 2010.  
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: The next chapter briefly presents some of the 
literature related to the AABH model. In chapter 3 the AABH model and its results are 
described in detail. Chapter 4 presents a two regions model that I have developed from the 
framework of AABH. In chapter 5 all the numerical analysis are made and results are 
presented. Chapter 6 concludes and summarizes the results of this thesis.            
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2 Literature Overview 
The AABH model builds on two stands of literature: Endogenous growth theory and climate 
policy with endogenous technical change. In endogenous growth theory “the rate of 
technological progress, and hence the long-run rate of economic growth, can be influenced 
by economic factors” (Howitt 2008). Endogenous technical change means that technological 
improvements take place through innovations, which again is determined by economic 
factors and policies. 
Two of the most cited contributions to endogenous growth theory are the work of Romer 
(1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992). In Romer innovation is driven by researchers 
discovering new intermediate input varieties making it possible to expand production 
continuously. Aghion and Howitt presented a model of growth through creative destruction. 
They showed that the profits from current research could be destroyed by future research, 
which discourages innovations. In their model new innovations improve the quality of 
existing products, which is the framework adopted by AABH. 
The other stand of literature investigates optimal climate policy when technical change is 
based on R&D or learning by doing effects, see for instance Goulder and Mathai (2000) and 
Grübler and Messner (1998). A later contribution to this field is Greaker and Pade (2009) 
who investigated the relationship between emission taxes and technological change. Their 
model has only one research and development sector (no dirty R&D), and they considered a 
case without any form of R&D subsidies. They found that when the technological change 
was endogenous and driven by R&D, the carbon taxes should be higher than if the 
technological change was exogenous.  
The AABH model is an endogenous growth model with directed technical change, which 
implies that the research will be directed to the most profitable sector. It is a two-sector 
model where technological change is based on R&D. The model considers both a carbon tax 
and a subsidy to R&D. The major claim in AABH is that R&D subsidies to clean technologies 
are more important than carbon taxes when environmental concerns are being considered. 
In traditional environmental economics the carbon tax plays an important role when 
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correcting for the environmental externality, see for instance Nordhaus (2008), so this result 
is quite controversial.  
There are several properties of the AABH model that could be discussed. In the AABH 
framework a patent only lasts for one period. Greaker and Heggedal (2012) examined this 
assumption by introducing long-lived patents into the AABH model. They also find that R&D 
should be redirected to the clean technologies. However the carbon tax plays a more 
important role with long-lived patents. Greaker and Heggedal have also developed a 
numerical model which this thesis will build upon.  
Some may object to dividing technologies into clean and dirty. However there are two 
empirical papers that confirm the assumptions of the AABH model. Dechezleprêtre et al 
(2013) compared the knowledge spillovers from clean and dirty technologies. Their empirical 
analysis shows that clean technologies induce larger knowledge spillovers than dirty 
technologies, which justify higher subsidies for clean R&D. Aghion et al (2012) analysed 
directed technical change in the auto sector using panel data. Their analysis showed strong 
evidence for path dependency, which means that firms that are more exposed to clean 
innovations, are more likely to direct their research to the clean sector. If a firm has a history 
of clean innovation, it will probably focus on clean research in the future as well.  
Based on the discussion above, I conclude that the AABH model seems robust, and this is the 
reason why it is chosen for this analysis. The AABH model is described in detail in the next 
chapter. 
 
 
   
     
 
6 
 
3 The AABH model 
3.1  Directed technical change in clean and dirty 
technologies 
In the paper The Environment and Directed Technical Change AABH presents a global two- 
sector model with a unique final good. The final good is produced using clean and dirty 
inputs, where the production of the dirty input creates environmental degradation. The two 
inputs are produced using labour and sector specific machines, provided by monopolistically 
competitive firms. Scientists build on previous innovations and try to improve the quality of 
the machines. If a scientist is successful in innovating a better version of a machine, he/she 
obtains a one-period patent and becomes the entrepreneur for the current period in the 
production of that machine. The scientists choose which sector to direct their research 
against in order to maximize their expected profit. 
The dirty input production increases the temperature due to a larger carbon stock. When 
the temperature increases, environmental quality goes down. If the environmental quality 
falls below a critical threshold, an environmental disaster will happen, and the utility of the 
consumer goes to minus infinity.  
The AABH model is a growth model with endogenous and directed technical change. This 
means that the scientists are not randomly allocated between the two sectors, but direct 
their research to the most profitable sector in the economy. The model studies the 
technological response that follows from different environmental policies, where the 
intention is to avoid an environmental disaster.       
One of the main results of AABH is that if the two sectors are highly substitutable, carbon 
taxes and research subsidies can redirect technical change. These policy instruments are 
only needed until the clean sector catches up with the technology level in the dirty sector. 
This means that an environmental disaster can be avoided without sacrificing a considerable 
amount of long-run growth.  
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3.2  Model description 
This section presents the general framework of the AABH model. It will go through all of the 
production sectors: Final good, intermediates and machines, in addition to the innovation 
sector. It will also state the consumer preferences and the environmental constraints. 
 
Production: 
Final good: 
There is a unique final good 𝑌𝑡 produced in a competitive market using clean and dirty 
inputs, 𝑌𝑐𝑡 and 𝑌𝑑𝑡. The production function of the final good is:  
 
(1) 𝑌𝑡 = (𝑌𝑐𝑡
𝜀−1
𝜀 + 𝑌𝑑𝑡
𝜀−1
𝜀   )
𝜀
𝜀−1   , 
 
where 𝑡 denotes time and 𝜀 is the elasticity of substitution between the two inputs. When 
𝜀 > 1 the two inputs are gross substitutes, and when 𝜀 < 1 they are gross compliments. I 
will from now on assume that 𝜀 > 1, which indicates that clean technologies can substitute 
for dirty technologies. The price of the final good is normalized to 1 so that:  
 
(2) [𝑝𝑐𝑡
1−𝜀 + 𝑝𝑑𝑡
1−𝜀]
1
1−𝜀 = 1, 
 
where 𝑝𝑐𝑡 and 𝑝𝑑𝑡 are the prices of the clean and dirty inputs.  
The production function (1) is constant returns to scale. Thus, the quantity 𝑌𝑡 is decided by 
demand, and the final good producers choose the use of the two input factors according to 
the following cost minimization problem: 
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(3) min𝑌𝑐𝑡 ,𝑌𝑑𝑡 {𝑝𝑐𝑡𝑌𝑐𝑡 + 𝑝𝑑𝑡𝑌𝑑𝑡},  
given that 𝑌𝑡 = (𝑌𝑐𝑡
𝜀−1
𝜀 + 𝑌𝑑𝑡
𝜀−1
𝜀   )
𝜀
𝜀−1  ,  
 
taking the input prices as given. The first order conditions with respect to the two inputs are 
given by:  
 
(4) 𝛾
𝜀
𝜀−1
[𝑌𝑐𝑡
𝜀−1
𝜀 + 𝑌𝑑𝑡
𝜀−1
𝜀  ]
𝜀
𝜀−1
−1
× 
𝜀−1
𝜀
𝑌𝑐𝑡
𝜀−1
𝜀
−1 − 𝑝𝑐𝑡 = 0, 
 
(5) 𝛾
𝜀
𝜀−1
[𝑌𝑐𝑡
𝜀−1
𝜀 + 𝑌𝑑𝑡
𝜀−1
𝜀  ]
𝜀
𝜀−1
−1
× 
𝜀−1
𝜀
𝑌𝑑𝑡
𝜀−1
𝜀
−1 − 𝑝𝑑𝑡 = 0,  
 
where 𝛾 is the Lagrange multiplier. From the first order conditions it follows that the 
producers will use a combination of clean and dirty inputs according to:  
 
(6) 
𝑝𝑐𝑡
𝑝𝑑𝑡
= (
𝑌𝑐𝑡
𝑌𝑑𝑡
)
−
1
𝜀
. 
 
The AABH model assumes that initially the clean sector is sufficiently backward relative to 
the dirty sector, so  𝑝𝑐𝑡 > 𝑝𝑑𝑡. This means that when producing the final good, the dirty 
input will be used more than the clean. 
  
Intermediate: 
The two inputs 𝑌𝑐𝑡 and 𝑌𝑑𝑡 are produced using a continuum of sector specific machines and 
labour: 
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(7) 𝑌𝑗𝑡 = 𝐿𝑗𝑡
1−𝛼 ∫ 𝐴𝑗𝑖𝑡
1−𝛼1
0
𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝛼 𝑑𝑖,    
 
where 𝛼 ∈ (0,1), 𝐴𝑗𝑖𝑡  is the quality of the machine of type i used in sector j ∈ {𝑐, 𝑑} at time t, 
𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡  is the quantity of the machine used, and 𝐿𝑗𝑡 is labour in each sector. That the machines 
are sector specific means that if a machine is used in the clean sector, it will not be used in 
the production of the dirty input. Following Greaker and Heggedal (2012), the producers of 
the intermediates maximize their profits under competitive conditions according to:   
 
(8) max𝐿𝑗𝑡,𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡 {(𝑝𝑗𝑡 − 𝜏𝑗𝑡)𝑌𝑗𝑡 − 𝑤𝑡𝐿𝑗𝑡 − ∫ 𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡
1
0
𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡 𝑑𝑖}, 
 
where 𝑤𝑡 is the wage at time t, 𝜏𝑑𝑡 is the carbon tax (𝜏𝑐𝑡 = 0) and 𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡 is the price of 
machine type 𝑖 used in sector j ∈ {𝑐, 𝑑}. When inserting for 𝑌𝑗𝑡 from (7), (8) can be written 
as:  
 
(9) max𝐿𝑗𝑡,𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡 {(𝑝𝑗𝑡 − 𝜏𝑗𝑡)𝐿𝑗𝑡
1−𝛼 ∫ 𝐴𝑗𝑖𝑡
1−𝛼1
0
𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝛼  𝑑𝑖 − 𝑤𝑡𝐿𝑗𝑡 − ∫ 𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡
1
0
𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡 𝑑𝑖}. 
 
From the first order condition the demand for machine type 𝑖 is given by:  
 
(10) 𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡 = (
(𝑝𝑗𝑡−𝜏𝑗𝑡)𝛼
𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡
)
1
1−𝛼
𝐿𝑗𝑡𝐴𝑗𝑖𝑡 . 
 
The market clearing condition for the labour market requires that labour demand in both 
sectors must be equal to total labour supply:  
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(11) 𝐿𝑐𝑡 + 𝐿𝑑𝑡 = 1,  
 
where total labour supply is normalized to one.  
 
Machine producers: 
In both sectors monopolistically competitive firms supply the machines. The machine 
producers solve the following maximization problem:  
 
(12) max𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡   {𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡(𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡) − 𝜓(1 − 𝑠)𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡(𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡)}, 
 
where 𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡  is a function of 𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡 given by (10). It costs 𝜓 units of the final good to produce one 
unit of any machine, and 𝑠 is the subsidy rate to correct for the monopoly distortion1. The 
first order condition with respect to 𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡 is:  
 
(13) 𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 
 𝜓 (1−s)
𝛼
 ,  
 
which gives the machine price. The model assumes 𝜓 ≡ 𝛼2 and inserting for 𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡 from (13), 
(10) can be rewritten as: 
 
(14) 𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡 = (
(𝑝𝑗𝑡−𝜏𝑗𝑡)
(1−s)
)
1
1−𝛼
𝐿𝑗𝑡𝐴𝑗𝑖𝑡 , 
 
                                                 
1 A monopolist will set the price too high and the quantity to low compared to the social optimum. 
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where 𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡  is the demand for machine type 𝑖 used in sector j. 
Greaker and Heggedal (2012) have shown that the optimal subsidy rate that gives price 
equal to marginal cost is 𝑠 = 1 − 𝛼. The equilibrium profits of machine producers are then 
found using (12) - (14) and can be written as:  
 
(15) 𝜋𝑗𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼)𝛼
1−2𝛼
1−𝛼 (𝑝𝑗𝑡 − 𝜏𝑗𝑡)
1
1−𝛼𝐿𝑗𝑡𝐴𝑗𝑖𝑡 . 
 
This expression is essential; it gives the per period profit of holding a patent on machine type 
𝑖 used in sector 𝑗. It will be discussed in further detail under the innovation part.    
 
Consumption: 
The AABH model considers an infinite-horizon discrete time economy with one infinitely-
lived representative consumer. The representative consumer has preferences given by:  
 
(16) ∑
1
(1+𝜌)𝑡
∞
𝑡=0  𝑢(𝐶𝑡, 𝑆𝑡), 
 
where 𝐶𝑡 is consumption of the final good, 𝑡 denotes time and 𝜌 is the discount rate. 
𝑆𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑆] measures the environmental quality, where 𝑆 is the maximum level which is 
obtained when there is no human pollution.  
The consumer’s preferences are of the Ramsey type, where the infinitely-lived consumer 
represents a family covering all generations. The term 
1
(1+𝜌)𝑡
 is the discounting function of 
future periods, which may be interpreted as the probability of the world’s existence at 
time 𝑡.          
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Since there is no saving between periods, the market clearing for the final good implies that: 
 
(17) 𝐶𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡 − 𝜓 (∫ 𝑥𝑐𝑖𝑡
1
0
𝑑𝑖 + ∫ 𝑥𝑑𝑖𝑡  𝑑𝑖 
1
0
), 
 
where 𝐶𝑡 is consumption of the final good. The production of the final good in one period is 
used for consumption in the same period, except the units that are used in machine 
production.   
The utility function is increasing in consumption and environmental quality. It is twice 
differentiable and jointly concave in (C, S). The AABH model imposes the following 
conditions: 
 
(18)  𝑙𝑖𝑚𝐶↓0
𝜕𝑢(𝐶,𝑆)
𝜕𝐶
=  ∞,     𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑆↓0
𝜕𝑢(𝐶,𝑆)
𝜕𝑆
=  ∞,     𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑆↓0 𝑢(𝐶, 𝑆) = −∞, 
 
meaning that when the environmental quality goes towards zero, the utility consequences 
for the representative consumer will be severe. The model also assumes: 
 
(19) 
𝜕𝑢(𝐶,𝑆)
𝜕𝑆
= 0, 
 
which implies that when the environmental quality is at its maximum level, the value of a 
further marginal increase will be zero.   
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The environment: 
The environmental quality 𝑆𝑡 evolves over time according to: 
 
(20) 𝑆𝑡+1 = −𝜉𝑌𝑑𝑡 + (1 + 𝛿)𝑆𝑡, 
 
as long as the right hand side of (20) is in the interval (0, 𝑆). If it is greater than 𝑆, 𝑆𝑡+1 = 𝑆, 
and if the right hand side is negative, 𝑆𝑡+1 = 0. The parameter 𝜉 is the rate of environmental 
degradation resulting from the dirty inputs production, while 𝛿 is the rate of environmental 
regeneration measuring how much pollution the nature can neutralize. If the environmental 
quality becomes critically low to a point of no return, we have what is defined as an 
environmental disaster. This happens if 𝑆𝑡 = 0 for some 𝑡 < ∞.  
 
Innovations: 
There is an innovation sector divided between clean and dirty technology. At the beginning 
of every period each scientist decides which sector to work in, and they are then randomly 
allocated to at most one machine. The scientist is successful in innovation with probability 
𝜂𝑗 ∈ (0,1) in sector 𝑗 ∈ {𝑐, 𝑑}. A successful innovation increases the quality of a machine 
from 𝐴𝑗𝑖𝑡  to (1 + 𝛾)𝐴𝑗𝑖𝑡, where 𝛾 > 0. If a scientist is successful in innovating a better 
version of machine 𝑖, he or she obtains a one-period patent and becomes the entrepreneur 
for the current period in the production of that machine. In sectors where innovation is not 
successful, a randomly chosen entrepreneur will receive the monopoly rights and then use 
the old technology. 
The machines have different productivity, and the scientists do not know which machine 
they will be allocated to. When deciding which sector to work in, they therefore base their 
decisions on the average productivity of the machines in each sector. The average 
productivity in sector j is given by:  
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(21) 𝐴𝑗𝑡 ≡ ∫ 𝐴𝑗𝑖𝑡
1
0
𝑑𝑖, 
 
and evolves over time according to: 
 
(22) 𝐴𝑗𝑡 = (1 + 𝛾𝜂𝑗𝑠𝑗𝑡)𝐴𝑗𝑡−1, 
 
where 𝑠𝑗𝑡 denote the number of scientists working on machines in sector j at time t. The 
average productivity in sector j today depends on the productivity level in that sector the 
previous period, the number of scientists doing research in that sector and the probability of 
a successful innovation. The initial levels 𝐴𝑐0 and 𝐴𝑑0 are given, and the AABH model 
assumes that the clean sector is sufficiently backward relative to the dirty sector.  
A scientist will base his decision on the expected profit when deciding which sector to work 
in. If the scientist is successful in innovation, he/she will obtain a monopoly profit for one 
period given by (15). The expected profit Π𝑗𝑡  for a scientist doing research in sector j at time 
t is therefore: 
 
(23) Π𝑗𝑡 = 𝜂𝑗(1 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝛼)𝛼
1−2𝛼
1−𝛼 (𝑝𝑗𝑡 − 𝜏𝑗𝑡)
1
1−𝛼𝐿𝑗𝑡𝐴𝑗𝑡−1. 
 
The expected profit equals the monopoly profit in the last period before the innovation 
occurs, multiplied with the quality improvement (1 + 𝛾) and the probability 𝜂𝑗 of a 
successful innovating in that sector. The profitability increases with the number of workers 
𝐿𝑗𝑡  employed in the sector and with the average productivity of the machines 𝐴𝑗𝑡−1. The 
expected profit of a scientist in sector j is larger the higher the price of the input the sector 
produces, which is denoted by 𝑝𝑗𝑡. 
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The relative benefit from undertaking research in the clean sector relative to the dirty sector 
follows from (23) and is given by: 
 
(24) 
Π𝑐𝑡
Π𝑑𝑡
= 
𝜂𝑐
𝜂𝑑
 × (
𝑝𝑐𝑡
𝑝𝑑𝑡−𝜏𝑑𝑡
)
1
1−𝛼
 
⏟        
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
×
𝐿𝑐𝑡
𝐿𝑑𝑡
 
⏟
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
 ×
𝐴𝑐𝑡−1
𝐴𝑑𝑡−1⏟
.
𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
 
 
The higher this ratio, the more profitable is R&D in the clean sector. AABH define three 
effects that are affecting the profitability:  
1. The price effect, which favours the sector with higher prices. A tax on dirty inputs will 
therefore favour clean R&D. 
2. The market size effect, encouraging innovation in the sector with the larger market 
for machines when the two input are substitutes. AABH assume that initially there is 
a larger market for dirty machines, so this effect will favour the dirty sector.  
3. The direct productivity effect, which pushes innovations towards the sector with 
highest productivity. This is due to the standing on shoulders effect given by 
 (1 + 𝛾)𝐴𝑗𝑖𝑡, indicating that the productivity improvement is higher the more 
advanced the sector is. This effect will favour the dirty sector, since AABH assume 
that initially the clean sector is relatively backwards in comparison. 
If the expression in (24) favours the dirty sector, the social planner can introduce a subsidy 
to make R&D in the clean sector more profitable. The expected profit from undertaking 
research in the clean sector when there is a research subsidy becomes:  
 
(25) Π𝑐𝑡 = (1 + 𝑞𝑡)𝜂𝑐(1 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝛼)𝛼
1−2𝛼
1−𝛼 𝑝𝑐𝑡
1
1−𝛼
𝐿𝑐𝑡𝐴𝑐𝑡−1, 
 
where 𝑞𝑡 is the subsidy rate. The subsidy is given to successful scientists in the clean sector 
and is financed through a lump-sum tax on the representative household.   
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The number of scientists is normalized to 1, and the market clearing condition for scientists 
requires that each scientist is employed either in the clean or dirty sector:  
 
(26) 𝑠𝑐𝑡 + 𝑠𝑑𝑡 = 1. 
 
Since the expected profit of one scientist is not affected by the choice of the other scientists, 
all the scientists will choose the same sector. The solution will therefore be a corner solution 
where 𝑠𝑐𝑡 or  𝑠𝑑𝑡 = 1.   
 
3.3  Results  
This section states the main results of the paper by AABH. It distinguishes between the 
business as usual equilibrium and the situation with optimal policy intervention.  
3.3.1 Laissez-Faire Equilibrium 
AABH characterize the laissez-faire equilibrium as the situation without any policy 
interventions. They assume that initially the dirty sector is more advanced relative to the 
clean sector, and show that there exists a unique equilibrium where innovations only occurs 
in the dirty sector. The scientists will direct their research towards the dirty sector in order 
to maximize their expected profit. 𝐴𝑑𝑡  will grow, while 𝐴𝑐𝑡 will remain constant, so the gap 
between the two sectors will increase even more. The dirty input production 𝑌𝑑𝑡 will 
increase over time which makes the carbon stock larger. Without any policy interventions 
this leads to an environmental disaster.  
3.3.2 Socially optimal allocation 
The social optimal allocation must correct for three market failures: The environmental 
externality from dirty input producers, the knowledge externalities from R&D and the 
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monopoly distortion in the production of machines. AABH shows that this can be done by 
using a carbon tax, a subsidy to clean innovations and a subsidy for the use of all machines.  
The social planner maximizes the utility of the representative consumer using the available 
policy instruments. The social planner’s problem becomes: 
 
(27) max∑
1
(1+𝜌)𝑡
∞
𝑡=0 𝑢(𝐶𝑡, 𝑆𝑡), 
 
subject to (1), (7), (11), (17), (20), (22) and (26). AABH finds a dynamic path of final good 
production 𝑌𝑡, consumption 𝐶𝑡, input productions 𝑌𝑗𝑡, machine productions 𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡, labour 
allocations 𝐿𝑗𝑡, scientist allocations 𝑠𝑗𝑡, environmental quality 𝑆𝑡, and qualities of machines 
𝐴𝑗𝑖𝑡, which determines the socially optimal allocation.  
The optimal policy involves avoiding an environmental disaster by switching the innovations 
towards the clean sector. When the two inputs are substitutes, all research can be 
redirected to the clean sector by introducing a R&D subsidy that is sufficiently high. The 
ratio 𝐴𝑐𝑡/𝐴𝑑𝑡  will increase, which increases the profitability of the clean sector compared to 
the dirty sector.  
If the two inputs are strong substitutes and initial environmental quality is high enough, an 
environmental disaster can be avoided by introducing a temporary research subsidy. When 
the ratio 𝐴𝑐𝑡/𝐴𝑑𝑡 has become sufficiently high, scientists will direct their research to the 
clean sector even without a subsidy. However if the two inputs are weak substitutes, 
temporary research subsidies are not enough due to the price effect. The subsidies need to 
be permanent in order to avoid an environmental disaster.       
An emission tax is used to correct for the environmental externality. This tax reduces the 
production of the dirty input and discourages innovations in the dirty sector. To only use a 
carbon tax to correct for both the environmental externality and the knowledge externalities 
from R&D, would lead to excessive distortions. This would imply a higher carbon tax that 
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would reduce consumption and distort production more than when a R&D subsidy is used as 
well. 
A subsidy for machines is used to correct for the monopoly distortion. In a monopoly 
situation too few machines are sold due to higher prices. By introducing a subsidy, the price 
of the machines will go down, and the optimal amount of machines will be used.  
AABH uses numerical simulations to illustrate the implications of their findings. The results 
from the numerical analysis presented in the article by AABH are illustrated in figure 1. AABH 
considers three different cases [𝜀 = 10, 𝜌 = 0,015], [𝜀 = 3, 𝜌 = 0,015], and  
[𝜀 = 3, 𝜌 = 0,001].  
 
 
Figure 1: The results from the AABH model. This figure is borrowed from the article by AABH.  
 
Case 1: The situation when [𝜀 = 10, 𝜌 = 0,015] is illustrated by the green (or solid) line. 
Panel A shows that the optimal subsidy to clean research is decreasing and only temporary. 
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Panel B shows that the optimal environmental policy involves switching all the scientists 
towards the clean sector in the first period. In panel C the optimal carbon tax is illustrated. 
The tax is very low and is only needed for a limited period. This is because the immediate 
switch to clean R&D makes this tax unnecessary, and because environmental damages are 
negligible as long as ∆𝑡< 6°C.  
Case 2: The situation when [𝜀 = 3, 𝜌 = 0,015] is illustrated by the red (or small dotted) line. 
Panel B shows that the optimal shift to clean research occurs around year 50. In panel A the 
optimal subsidy is larger and last longer compared to case 1. This is because the switch to 
clean research occurs later. Panel C shows that there is a much higher carbon tax compared 
to the other cases, and that it will increase over time.  
Case 3: The situation when [𝜀 = 3, 𝜌 = 0,001] is illustrated by the blue (or long dotted) line. 
Panel B shows that all research will be redirected to the clean sector immediately. In panel A 
the subsidy will be larger than in case 1, but smaller than in case 2. The optimal carbon tax is 
illustrated in figure C. The tax is very small, but a little higher than in case 1.  
The AABH model concludes that when the two inputs are highly substitutable, an 
environmental disaster can be avoided without sacrificing a considerable amount of long-run 
growth. This is a more optimistic view than the answers from exogenous technology models 
and depends on the assumption of endogenous and directed technical change  
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4 A two regions model 
4.1  Model description 
The AABH model analyses the whole world as one unit. In this section I will extend the model 
into two regions, which I name Environmental Concerned (E) and Unconcerned (U). I will 
assume that only Environmental Concerned cares about the environment. Since countries 
have different locations, economic situations and resources, it is reasonable that they have 
different environmental concerns and politics. This is also supported by the lack of an 
international climate agreement between all countries in the world.  
The clean and dirty technologies are not defined in the article by AABH. I will in this model 
assume that the final good is electricity, and that the two inputs are electricity from clean 
and dirty production methods. The clean inputs are electricity from sources such as wind, 
solar and hydro, while the dirty inputs are electricity from sources such as coal, oil and gas. 
The electricity assumption is made due to its increasing share of total energy demand and its 
potential for renewables, which is shown by the IEA in the Energy Technology Perspectives 
20142. 
The two regions different environmental concerns are reflected by the preferences of the 
consumers. Each region will have its own representative consumer, so the global framework 
will have two representative consumers. The consumer in Environmental Concerned has the 
same preferences as in AABH, but the consumer in Unconcerned now has preferences given 
by: 
 
(28) ∑
1
(1+𝜌)𝑡
∞
𝑡=0  𝑢𝑈(𝐶𝑡𝑈). 
 
                                                 
2 “Since the 1970s, electricity’s overall share of total energy demand has risen from 9% to over 17%” (IEA 2014 
p.10). The International Energy Agency predicts that it will continue to rise and be at 25% by 2050. According to 
their numbers the global share of renewables was 13,2% of the total energy supply in 2012. The share of 
renewables in electricity generation was almost 22% in 2013, which is a 5% increase from 2012. 
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which indicates that the utility function of the consumer in Unconcerned is not affected by 
the environmental quality.    
Both regions produce the final good and also the intermediates according to the framework 
above, so each region will have its own version. The variables subscript will be extended with 
𝑟 ∈ {𝐸, 𝑈} that indicates the region. The elasticity of substitution between the two inputs 𝜀 
will be the same in the two regions. Each region uses their final good for consumption and 
production of the machines in their own region, so there is no trade. Since we think of Y as 
electricity, the no trade assumption is reasonable if we look away from trade in fossil fuels 
and assume coal in unlimited amounts in both regions.       
The population in Environmental Concerned/ Unconcerned is employed in either the clean 
or the dirty sector where they live, so labour is not mobile between the two regions. The 
market clearing condition for the labour market requires that labour demand in both sectors 
in one region must be equal to total labour supply in the same region: 
 
(29) 𝐿𝑐𝑡𝑟 + 𝐿𝑑𝑡𝑟 = 𝐿𝑟 ,  
 
where 𝐿𝐸 and 𝐿𝑈 is total labour supply in Environmental Concerned and Unconcerned. The 
two regions are endowed with equal amount of labour which is normalized to one, hence 
𝐿𝐸 = 𝐿𝑈 = 1. This indicates that the population size is the same in the two regions. 
The pollution function is global, and it does not matter if the pollution is done by 
Environmental Concerned or Unconcerned. The global environmental quality 𝑆𝑡 evolves over 
time according to: 
 
(30) 𝑆𝑡+1 = −𝜉(𝑌𝑑𝑡𝐸 + 𝑌𝑑𝑡𝑈) + (1 + 𝛿)𝑆𝑡, 
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where 𝑌𝑑𝑡𝐸  is pollution from Environmental Concerned, and 𝑌𝑑𝑡𝑈 is pollution from 
Unconcerned. The environmental quality will therefore be the same in the two regions and 
depend on the total pollution. The properties of this equation will otherwise be the same as 
in the initial framework.  
The scientists have a global perspective and sell their machines to both regions. Each 
machine is sector specific, so a scientist that obtains a patent on a clean machine becomes 
the machine producer of that machine in the clean sector in both regions. 𝐴𝑗𝑖𝑡  which is the 
quality of the machine of type 𝑖 is therefore the same in both regions, meaning perfect 
technology transfer. The per period profit of holding a patent on machine type 𝑖 used in 
sector 𝑗 now becomes: 
 
(31) 𝜋𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 𝜋𝑗𝑖𝑡𝐸 + 𝜋𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑈 
= (1 − 𝛼)𝛼
1−2𝛼
1−𝛼 𝐴𝑗𝑖𝑡 [(𝑝𝑗𝑡𝐸 − 𝜏𝑗𝑡𝐸)
1
1−𝛼𝐿𝑗𝑡𝐸 + (𝑝𝑗𝑡𝑈)
1
1−𝛼𝐿𝑗𝑡𝑈] . 
 
The scientists will take the expected profit from both regions into account when deciding 
with sector to direct their research towards. The expected profit Π𝑗𝑡  for a scientist doing 
research in sector j at time t is therefore: 
 
(32) Π𝑗𝑡 = Π𝑗𝑡𝐸 +  Π𝑗𝑡𝑈  
= 𝜂𝑗(1 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝛼)𝛼
1−2𝛼
1−𝛼 𝐴𝑗𝑡−1 [(𝑝𝑗𝑡𝐸 − 𝜏𝑗𝑡𝐸)
1
1−𝛼𝐿𝑗𝑡𝐸 + (𝑝𝑗𝑡𝑈)
1
1−𝛼𝐿𝑗𝑡𝑈]. 
 
The relative benefit from undertaking research in the clean sector relative to the dirty sector 
when there are two regions is given by: 
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(33) 
Π𝑐𝑡
Π𝑑𝑡
= 
𝜂𝑐
𝜂𝑑
 ×
𝐴𝑐𝑡−1
𝐴𝑑𝑡−1⏟
𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
×   
{ [ (
𝑝𝑐𝑡𝐸
𝑝𝑑𝑡𝐸 − 𝜏𝑑𝑡𝐸
)
1
1−𝛼
 
⏟          
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑
×
𝐿𝑐𝑡𝐸
𝐿𝑑𝑡𝐸
 
⏟
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛.  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑
]
+ [ (
𝑝𝑐𝑡𝑈
𝑝𝑑𝑡𝑈
)
1
1−𝛼
 
⏟      
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑
×
𝐿𝑐𝑡𝑈
𝐿𝑑𝑡𝑈
 
⏟
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑
] } , 
 
where the effects are described in the general framework. Each region will therefore effect 
the scientists decision through the price effect and market size effect.  
The government in Environmental Concerned can introduce a subsidy to clean research in 
order to make the clean sector more profitable for the scientists. The expected profit from 
undertaking research in the clean sector then becomes:  
 
(34) Π𝑐𝑡 = 𝜂𝑐(1 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝛼)𝛼
1−2𝛼
1−𝛼 𝐴𝑐𝑡−1 [(1 + 𝑞𝑡𝐸)(𝑝𝑐𝑡𝐸)
1
1−𝛼𝐿𝑐𝑡𝐸 + (𝑝𝑐𝑡𝑈)
1
1−𝛼𝐿𝑐𝑡𝑈], 
 
where 𝑞𝑡𝐸 is the subsidy rate in Environmental Concerned. Since Unconcerned does not care 
about the environment, their subsidy rate to clean research 𝑞𝑡𝑈 will always be 0.  
For simplicity I assume that the Unconcerned region will not try to affect the R&D decision. 
This assumption will be discussed later in chapter 5. Without this assumption it is possible 
that the Unconcerned region starts subsidizing dirty R&D in order to neutralize the subsidy 
from Environmental Concerned.    
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4.2  Equilibrium condition 
In the AABH model the social planner maximizes the discounted utility of the representative 
consumer as shown above in equation (27). In the two regions framework there will be two 
social planners, one for each region. The social planners maximize the discounted utility of 
the representative consumer in its own region using the available policy instruments.  
The planner in Environmental Concerned can use a carbon tax, R&D subsidy to clean 
innovations and a subsidy to machines in order to maximize the discounted utility of its 
representative consumer. Since the consumer in Unconcerned does not care about the 
environment, the only policy instrument the planner in Unconcerned will use, is the subsidy 
to correct for the monopoly distortion. I assume that this subsidy will always take place in 
both regions in order to focus on the environmental considerations.  
In the first period the scientists choose either the clean or the dirty sector in order to 
maximize their expected profit. Since the expected profit of one scientist is not affected by 
the choice of the other scientists, all the scientists will choose the same sector. If the social 
planner in Environmental Concerned wants to redirect innovations towards the clean sector, 
he/she must make the clean sector equally or more profitable for the scientists compared to 
the dirty sector.  
In order to solve the two regions model, I define the equilibrium condition as the situation 
where the two social planners maximize the utility of their representative consumers given 
their policy instruments, and where none of the scientists wish to change their decision in 
any of the time periods. If all the scientists are in the clean sector, this sector will also be the 
sector where the expected profit is largest in order for the equilibrium condition to hold. The 
equilibrium solution will be a corner solution where all the scientists do research in the same 
sector. This follows from earlier discussion of the corner solution in AABH.   
In figure 1 the optimal environmental policy results from AABH are illustrated. In order to 
solve for the equilibrium solution in the two regions framework, I need to move on to 
numerical analysis.  
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5 Numerical model 
5.1  Model description 
In this section I will use a numerical framework to analyse the two regions model. The model 
is solved for 28 periods of 5 years each, so the time period is from 2010-2150. The numerical 
model is an extension of the quantitative example in the article by AABH and the simulations 
by Greaker and Heggedal.  
The evolution in the concentration of 𝐶𝑂2 in the atmosphere is given by: 
 
(35) 𝐶𝑐𝑜2,𝑡+1 = 𝜉 (
𝑌𝑑𝑡𝐸+𝑌𝑑𝑡𝑈
2
) + (1 + 𝑑)𝐶𝑐𝑜2,𝑡 − 1120𝑑, 
 
where 𝐶𝑐𝑜2,𝑡 is the carbon stock at time 𝑡. Greaker and Heggedal set the initial level of the 
carbon stock to 379 ppm, and I will also use this value. The parameters 𝜉 and 𝑑 is chosen to 
yield a reasonable evolution of the carbon stock in the business as usual (BAU) situation. In 
order to achieve this I use the values 𝜉 = 4 and 𝑑 = 0,00375215, which is also used by 
Greaker and Heggedal. 
The temperature increase from the concentration of 𝐶𝑂2 is given by: 
 
(36) ∆𝑡= 3𝑙𝑜𝑔2 (
𝐶𝑐𝑜2,𝑡
280
). 
 
This equation from the AABH framework implies that a doubling of 𝐶𝑂2 concentration in the 
atmosphere leads to a 3°C increase in current temperature.  
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Environmental quality in AABH is given by: 
 
(37) 𝜙 = 𝜙(∆(𝑆𝑡)) =
(∆𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟−∆(𝑆𝑡))
𝜆
−𝜆Δ𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟
𝜆−1 (∆𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟−∆(𝑆𝑡))
(1−𝜆)Δ𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟
𝜆 , 
 
where a disaster is defined as an increase in temperature equal to ∆𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟= 6°C.  ∆(𝑆𝑡) is 
the temperature increase function depending on environmental quality. Greaker and 
Heggedal have used the direct temperature increase instead, and this is the framework I will 
follow.  
The environmental quality function is therefore written as:  
 
(38) 𝜙𝑡 =
(6−∆𝑡)
𝜆−𝜆6𝜆−1(6−∆𝑡)
(1−𝜆)6𝜆
, 
 
where ∆𝑡 is given by (36). If ∆𝑡 ≥ 6, then 𝜙𝑡 = 0. In order to match this function with the 
Nordhaus’s damage function for temperature increases up to 3°C, AABH set 𝜆 = 0,1443, 
which is the value I will use.  
The utility function used by AABH and Greaker and Heggedal is: 
 
(39) 𝑢(𝐶𝑡, 𝑆𝑡) =
(𝜙𝑡∗𝐶𝑡)
1−𝜎
1−𝜎
, 
 
where 𝜙𝑡 is given by (38), 𝐶𝑡 is given by (17) and 𝜎 is the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution. I will use this utility function for the representative consumer in Environmental 
Concerned. The consumer in Unconcerned thus not cares about the environment so his 
utility function will be: 
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(40) 𝑢𝑈(𝐶𝑡𝑈) =
𝐶𝑡𝑈
1−𝜎
1−𝜎
. 
 
AABH set 𝜎 = 2 which matches Nordhaus’s choice of intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 
and I will use this value in the simulations.  
The AABH model considers two different values for 𝜀 and 𝜌 as illustrated in figure 1. Since I 
assume that the final good is electricity, I will use 𝜀 = 10 which is the high value. This choice 
is based on the assumption that clean electrical power and dirty electrical power is highly 
substitutable. I use the same discount rate as Greaker and Heggedal so 𝜌 = 0,015. The 
capital share is chosen by AABH to 𝛼 = 1/3, the probability of a successful innovation is the 
same in both sectors 𝜂𝑐 = 𝜂𝑑 = 0,02 and 𝛾 = 1, so that long-run annual growth rate is 
equal to 2 percent.  
The initial productivity levels 𝐴𝑐0 and 𝐴𝑑0 are given. In order to achieve a reasonable 
business as usual situation the initial values are set to 𝐴𝑑0 = 1 and 𝐴𝑐0 = 0,8, which yields a 
renewable share of 18,428% in period 0. IEA estimates that in 2011 about 21% of world 
electricity generation was from renewable energy, so these numbers seem reasonable. The 
simulations are also done for 𝐴𝑐0 = 0,65 and 𝐴𝑐0 = 0,5 in order to see how the initial 
productivity gap between the two sectors affects the results.   
 
5.2  Results 
5.2.1 Business as usual (BAU) 
In the BAU situation no policy instruments are available, so there are no government 
interventions due to environmental considerations. The government in Environmental 
Concerned will not subsidize clean R&D, and there is no carbon tax, so 𝑞𝑡𝐸 = 𝜏𝑗𝑡𝐸 = 0. 
The scientists will compare the expected profit between the two sectors in the first period. 
Since the expected profit is higher in the dirty sector in the BAU situation, all the scientists 
will direct their research towards that sector. The productivity development depends on the 
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number of researchers, and since all scientists are in the same sector, only the dirty 
machines will have productivity growth. This will make the dirty sector even more profitable 
compared to the clean, so all the scientists stay in the dirty sector.  
 
 
Figure 2: The BAU case shows the development of productivity levels in the two sectors and the expected profit 
to scientists doing research in the two sectors.  
 
Figure 2 illustrates this situation graphically for 𝐴𝑑0 = 1 and 𝐴𝑐0 = 0,8. The left vertical axis 
measures the productivity level in the two sectors, while the right measures the expected 
profit for the scientists. The horizontal axis is the timeline between 2010 and 2150. Initially 
in 2010 the productivity gap is 0,2 and the difference in expected profit is 0.090 between the 
two sectors. The blue line shows how the productivity in the dirty sector grows over time. 
The purple line shows how productivity in the clean sector stays constant, since there are no 
scientists working on clean machines. The red line is the expected profit of a scientist doing 
research in the dirty sector, and this increase together with the productivity growth. The 
green line is the expected profit of a scientist in the clean sector, which starts at 0,032 and 
drops towards zero as time goes by. The profitability of choosing the dirty sector for a 
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scientist will therefore increase over time, so no scientist wish to deviate from the dirty 
sector. The equilibrium condition holds, so this corner solution is stable.    
The two regions have the same production function and will use the same amount of the 
clean and dirty inputs in the BAU case. As time goes by, the production of the clean input will 
decrease, and labour will move towards the dirty sector. The firms will use less and less of 
the clean input and clean machines, and eventually there will be no activity in the clean 
sector. Since both regions use more and more of the dirty input, the carbon stock will 
increase and so will the temperature. The amount of consumption will be equal in the two 
regions in the BAU situation.  
 
 
Figure 3: The BAU case shows that without any policy interventions the economy moves towards an 
environmental disaster.    
 
Figure 3 shows the environmental changes and how these affect the consumers for 𝐴𝑑0 = 1 
and 𝐴𝑐0 = 0,8. The left vertical axis measures the environmental quality, consumption and 
temperature increase which is equal in the two regions. The right vertical axis measures the 
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discounted utilities in the two regions, and the horizontal axis is the timeline between 2010 
and 2150. The red line is the temperature increase, which increases due to a larger carbon 
stock as time goes by. The purple line is consumption, which rises over time and is equal in 
the two regions in the BAU situation. The blue line is environmental quality which decreases 
as the temperature increases, and it approaches 0 when the temperature increase is 6°C, 
which is the situation AABH refer to as an environmental disaster. The yellow line is the 
discounted utility for the consumer in Unconcerned, which increases due to increased 
consumption. The green line is the discounted utility for the consumer in Environmental 
Concerned, which follows the yellow line until an environmental disaster occurs. When an 
environmental disaster happens, the discounted utility for the Environmental Concerned 
region goes to minus infinity.  
In the BAU situation without any policy interventions, the economy is headed towards an 
environmental disaster with no economic activity in the clean sector. If the initial 
productivity level in the clean sector is 𝐴𝑐0 = 0,65 or 𝐴𝑐0 = 0,5 instead of 𝐴𝑐0 = 0,8, this 
result will not change. The consumers will be better and better off until the disaster occurs, 
but when it happens, it will have severe consequences for the consumer in Environmental 
Concerned.  The interpretation of this can be that one of the regions is more exposed to 
natural hazards such as storms, earthquakes and sea level rise. The United Nations 
University and the Alliance Development Works have calculated the World Risk index 
featured in the World Risk Report 2014, which rank the countries around the world based on 
their vulnerability and exposure to natural hazards. This report shows that there are large 
differences between the countries, which may lead to different environmental concerns 
(UNU-ADW).   
5.2.2 Research and development subsidy (R&D) 
In the BAU situation the utility of the Environmental Concerned consumer goes to minus 
infinity when an environmental disaster occurs. In order to avoid this, the government in the 
Environmental Concerned region can introduce a subsidy (financed through a lump-sum tax 
on the representative household) to clean research, making the clean sector more profitable 
for the scientists.  
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In order to avoid an environmental disaster, the Environmental Concerned region must 
redirect innovations towards the clean sector. If the expected profit of a scientist is larger in 
the dirty sector than in the clean, the Environmental Concerned region will introduce a 
subsidy making the clean sector equally or more profitable compared to the dirty. Since the 
expected profit is higher in the clean sector with a subsidy from the Environmental 
Concerned region, all the scientists will direct their research towards that sector.  The 
ratio 𝐴𝑐𝑡/𝐴𝑑𝑡  will increase, and when it has become sufficiently high, the scientists will direct 
their research to the clean sector even without a subsidy. 
Since the two inputs are substitutes, all research can be redirected to the clean sector by a 
temporary subsidy that is sufficiently high. How long the government in Environmental 
Concerned must subsidize the clean sector, and how large the subsidy must be, depends on 
the initial productivity gap between the two sectors. 
 
 
Figure 4a: The subsidy needed to redirect innovations towards the clean sector for different productivity levels. 
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Figure 4b: The subsidy needed to redirect innovations towards the clean sector for different productivity levels, 
measured in % of Y for the Environmental Concerned region. 
 
Figure 4a illustrates how large the subsidy must be in order to redirect innovations towards 
the clean sector for the different productivity levels. If 𝐴𝑐0 = 0,8, the blue line shows that 
the subsidy will start at 0,090 in year 2010 and decrease until year 2020. After this period it 
will be profitable for the scientists to stay in the clean sector even without a subsidy. If 
𝐴𝑐0 = 0,65, the red line shows that the subsidy must be larger and continue longer in order 
to redirect innovations. It will start at 0,129 and decrease until year 2030. If 𝐴𝑐0 = 0,5, the 
subsidy must start at 0,144 and continue until year 2045. Figure 4b illustrates the redirecting 
cost. It shows the size of the subsidy in terms of total electricity production for the 
Environmental Concerned region. 
Figure 5 shows how a subsidy can redirect innovations towards the clean sector for 
𝐴𝑐0 = 0,8. Initially when the expected profit is lower in the clean sector than in the dirty 
sector due to lower productivity, the government introduces a subsidy that makes the 
expected profit equal or larger in the clean sector. This subsidy is needed as long as the clean 
sector catches up with the productivity level in the dirty sector. When the productivity level 
in the clean sector is larger than in the dirty sector, the expected profit for the scientists will 
be larger in the clean sector even without a subsidy, so the subsidy is no longer needed.   
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Figure 5: The subsidy is only needed until the productivity level in the clean sector catches up with the 
productivity level in the dirty sector. 
 
If the government in Environmental Concerned choose to introduce a subsidy, an 
environmental disaster can be avoided. Figure 6 illustrates the economic situation for 
𝐴𝑐0 = 0,8 with the optimal subsidy given in figure 4a. If the subsidy is sufficiently high, the 
environmental quality will stabilize, and the discounted utility will increase as time goes by 
for both regions. Compared to the BAU situation in figure 3, the consumer in Environmental 
Concerned will be much better off, but the consumer in Unconcerned will be worse off since 
there will be a decrease in consumption compared to the BAU situation. The loss in utility for 
the Unconcerned consumer will be small compared to the gain for the Environmental 
Concerned consumer. The amount of consumption will otherwise be equal in the two 
regions.  
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Figure 6: An environmental disaster can be avoided if the R&D subsidy is sufficiently high. 
 
5.2.3 Carbon tax 
Another policy instrument the government in the Environmental Concerned region can use 
in order to avoid an environmental disaster, is a carbon tax. Since the Unconcerned region 
thus not cares about the environment, it will not introduce a carbon tax. The government in 
Environmental Concerned must therefore consider if it has the possibility to redirect the 
innovations to the clean sector by using a carbon tax in its own region.  
The key for the government in Environmental Concerned is to introduce a tax high enough, 
so that the scientists choose to direct their research towards the clean sector. As the 
productivity and activity in the clean sector catches up with the dirty sector, the emission tax 
is no longer needed. This is due to the same effects as in the subsidy case.  
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Figure 7: The innovations can be redirected towards the clean sector by introducing a carbon tax in the 
Environmental Concerned region.  
 
Figure 7 illustrates how a carbon tax can switch the innovations from the dirty towards the 
clean sector by using a carbon tax when 𝐴𝑐0 = 0,8. Initially the clean sector has lower 
productivity than the dirty sector. The government in Environmental Concerned can by using 
a carbon tax make the clean sector equally profitable for the scientists and therefore 
redirect the research. As the productivity in the clean sector catches up with the productivity 
in the dirty sector, the carbon tax moves towards zero. At this point the expected profit of a 
scientist in clean is larger than in dirty, so no scientist wants to redirect his/her research 
towards the dirty sector. The equilibrium condition is satisfied, so this corner solution with 
all scientists in the clean sector is stable.  
If 𝐴𝑐0 = 0,65 or 𝐴𝑐0 = 0,5, the government cannot redirect the innovation by using a carbon 
tax alone. The highest possible productivity gap that makes it possible to solve the 
environmental problem with a tax alone, is 𝐴𝑐0 = 0,74. This result is crucial and shows that 
the initial productivity gap between the two sectors determines which policy instruments 
that can be used in order to avoid an environmental disaster.  
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5.2.4 Optimal carbon tax when 𝑨𝒄𝟎 = 𝟎, 𝟔𝟓 and 𝑨𝒄𝟎 = 𝟎, 𝟓  
In order to investigate the optimal taxation when 𝐴𝑐0 = 0,65 and 𝐴𝑐0 = 0,5, the model 
needs to be extended. In the numerical simulations I have change the periods from 28 to 38, 
so the model goes to the year of 2200 instead of 2150.   
 
 
Figure 8: Optimal taxation policy for the Environmental Concerned region when 𝐴𝑐0 = 0,65, and the 
government cannot redirect the innovations towards the clean sector.      
 
Figure 8 highlight the optimal policy of the Environmental Concerned region when 
𝐴𝑐0 = 0,65. If taxation is the only available policy instrument, it is not possible for the 
government in Environmental Concerned to redirect innovations towards the clean sector 
when the productivity gap is of this size. The optimal policy will be an increasing carbon tax 
in order to delay an environmental disaster. When the environmental disaster occurs, the 
optimal carbon tax will be zero. A carbon tax will only be distortionary in this case, since the 
environmental quality will be zero no matter what. 
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In the BAU situation an environmental disaster takes place in the year 2150 in all the 
situations (𝐴𝑐0 = 0,80, 𝐴𝑐0 = 0,65, 𝐴𝑐0 = 0,50). When 𝐴𝑐0 = 0,65, the government in 
Environmental Concerned can delay the disaster by introducing an increasing carbon tax as 
shown in figure 8. The disaster will then appear in year 2180 instead of 2150. If 𝐴𝑐0 = 0,50, 
the government can delay the disaster until year 2175.      
5.2.5 Optimal policy          
Since the Unconcerned region has no policy instruments and does not care about the 
environment, the optimal policy will be from the perspective of the Environmental 
Concerned region. The government in Environmental Concerned maximizes the utility of 
their representative consumer using two policy instruments: A carbon tax and an R&D 
subsidy to clean research. In the optimal policy framework, the social planner in 
Environmental Concerned can combine these two policy instruments in order to achieve the 
best solution.  
The optimal policy involves redirecting all the scientists towards the clean sector, since only 
then can an environmental disaster be avoided. It will be optimal for the social planner to 
move all the scientists in the first period compared to later. The reason for this is that the 
longer the scientists work in the dirty sector, the higher is the productivity gap between the 
two sectors. As the productivity in the clean sector catches up with productivity in the dirty 
sector, final output increases more slowly compared to the BAU situation.  It will therefore 
be optimal to move the scientists in the first period in order to minimize the number of 
periods with slow growth in final output. This is the same result as in AABH.      
In some situations it may be reasonable to believe that the subsidy can only be given to a 
fraction of the scientists. If the government in Environmental Concerned can only subsidise 
the scientists in its own region, the location of the scientist is crucial. If the majority of the 
scientists live in Environmental Concerned and therefore can be subsidised, an 
environmental disaster can be avoided. It will be optimal for the social planner to subsidise 
every scientist if that is possible. The more scientists that work in the clean sector, the 
sooner will the productivity in the clean sector be equal to the productivity in the dirty 
sector, and the subsidy will therefore be needed for a shorter time period. If the majority of 
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the scientists live in Unconcerned, an environmental disaster cannot be avoided since the 
productivity in the dirty sector will always be greater compared to the clean.  
The government in Environmental Concerned will use an R&D subsidy to clean research and 
a very small carbon tax in the optimal policy framework. AABH have shown that when 
𝜀 = 10, the carbon tax is very low and applies only for a limited period. The reason for this is 
that the carbon tax should correct for the environmental externality from the dirty input, but 
since the switch to clean inputs happens almost immediately, this tax is unnecessary. This 
result also holds in the two regions framework. Since the optimal carbon tax is very low and 
only used for a limited period, there is not much difference between the subsidy case and 
the optimal policy situation.     
Table 1 is an overview that compares the different utility levels for the different policies 
when 𝐴𝑐0 = 0,80. The utility levels are the sum of the discounted utilities for the 
representative consumer in all time periods. Total subsidy is the sum of R&D subsidies 
needed to redirect the innovations towards the clean sector.  
 
 BAU Subsidy Tax Optimal 
Utility E − infinity − 6,408 − 6,607 −6,408 
Utility U − 5,546 − 6,382 − 6,382 −6,382 
Total Subsidy  0,179  0,174 
 
Table 1: The utility levels and total subsidy needed to redirect innovations when 𝐴𝑐0 = 0,80.  
 
The utility level for the Environmental Concerned consumer will be equal in the subsidy and 
optimal policy case as discussed above. The only difference is that under the optimal policy, 
the subsidy needed to redirect the scientists will be a bit smaller. The utility will be higher 
when a subsidy is used compared to using a carbon tax, since using a carbon tax both to 
reduce emissions and to influence the direction of research, leads to excessive distortions as 
shown by AABH. 
The consumer in Unconcerned will be worse off when the optimal policy is implemented 
compared to the BAU situation. The loss will however be much smaller than the gain of the 
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Environmental Concerned consumer, since that consumer’s utility goes to minus infinity in 
the BAU situation.  
 
5.3  Discussion  
The numerical analysis above depends on several assumptions. In this section I will explain 
some of the assumptions I have made about the two regions framework and discuss what 
happens if they change. I will also discuss the research subsidy in the AABH model. 
The two regions are of equal size in the framework above. If the Environmental Concerned 
region is largest, it will be easier to redirect the research since the market size effect from 
the Environmental Concerned region in equation (33) will be larger. Similar it will be harder 
and more costly in the opposite situation.  
In the analysis I have used 𝜀 = 10, which indicates a high value of substitution between the 
two inputs. AABH also considers the situation when 𝜀 = 3. In this situation AABH finds that 
the subsidy needed to redirect innovations is larger and last longer, and that the optimal 
carbon tax will be increasing (See figure 1). It is therefore reasonable to believe that if 𝜀 = 3, 
it will be harder and more costly to redirect the research also in the two regions framework.  
The Unconcerned consumer’s utility function is independent of the environmental quality in 
the two regions framework. This assumption is based on countries different environmental 
concerns, and that some are located in areas that are more exposed to natural hazards. It is 
reasonable that the Unconcerned consumer will put some weight on the environmental 
quality as well, so this assumption is probably too strong. However, since the effect is 
relatively small compared to the other region, it is omitted for simplicity.  
Earlier I assumed that the Unconcerned region will not try to affect the R&D decision. Since 
the consumer in Unconcerned will be worse off when the optimal policy is implemented 
(compared to the BAU situation), it is possible that the Unconcerned region starts 
subsidizing dirty R&D in order to neutralize the subsidy from Environmental Concerned. 
However the loss will be much smaller than the gain of the Environmental Concerned 
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consumer, since that consumer’s utility goes to minus infinity in the BAU situation. It will 
therefore be possible for the Environmental Concerned region to compensate the 
Unconcerned consumer for staying out of the R&D decision, and this is the reason why the 
assumption is reasonable. 
The research subsidy in AABH is financed through a lump-sum tax on the representative 
household. Since there is only one consumer who represents all workers, entrepreneurs and 
scientists, the consumer will both pay and receive the subsidy. The representative 
consumers utility is therefore not affected by the subsidy. In reality collecting taxes is hard 
and will probably cause some kind of costs and distortions.  
 
41 
 
6 Conclusion                         
This thesis investigates if it is possible to redirect R&D in a multi-region world where 
countries have different environmental concerns. In order to answer this question I have 
extended the AABH model into two regions that are identical in size and technology, the 
only difference is their environmental policy. I have looked at how the Environmental 
Concerned region can avoid an environmental disaster by introducing different policy 
instruments.  
In order to avoid an environmental disaster, all the technology improvement must be 
redirected to the clean sector. The optimal policy involves redirecting every scientist to the 
clean sector immediately by the use of a subsidy for clean R&D together with a very small 
carbon tax.  
It is reasonable to believe that in some situations the Environmental Concerned region 
cannot target all the scientists with a research subsidy. It will however still be possible to 
redirect the research if the Environmental Concerned region can subsidize a majority of the 
scientists. The process of redirecting technological change will take longer time and be more 
costly, but eventually all the research will be redirected to the clean sector, while the activity 
in the dirty sector will go to zero as time goes by.  
If a research subsidy is not available, the scientist can be redirected to the clean sector by 
using only a carbon tax if the productivity gap between the two sectors is not too large. If 
𝐴𝑑0 = 1, the innovations can be redirected if 𝐴𝑐0 ≥ 0,74. This policy with an emission tax 
acting on its own is suboptimal to the case with the research subsidy, since it leads to 
excessive distortions. 
The Kyoto Protocol has been criticized for not binding developing countries to any emission 
targets. Late 2015 a new climate conference is coming up in Paris, where the goal is to 
achieve a new international climate agreement involving every country in the world. This 
analysis shows that even if some countries choose not to contribute, it will still be possible to 
redirect R&D and avoid an environmental disaster if the Environmental Concerned countries 
go together and can target a majority of the scientists. This analysis also suggests that 
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discussing emission targets might not be the way to go. What really needs to be done is to 
increase the research on clean technologies, so they can compete with and eventually 
surpass the dirty ones.  
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Appendix 
This is the mathematical framework used in the two regions case. The variables subscript 
𝑟 ∈ {𝐸, 𝑈} indicates the region. Since the innovation sector is global the quality of the 
machines 𝐴𝑗𝑖𝑡  and the machine price 𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡 will be the same in both regions.          
 
Production and innovation: 
Final good: 
(41) 𝑌𝑡𝑟 = (𝑌𝑐𝑡𝑟
𝜀−1
𝜀 + 𝑌𝑑𝑡𝑟
𝜀−1
𝜀   )
𝜀
𝜀−1, 
 
(42) [𝑝𝑐𝑡𝑟
1−𝜀 + 𝑝𝑑𝑡𝑟
1−𝜀]
1
1−𝜀 = 1, 
 
(43) min𝑌𝑐𝑡𝑟,𝑌𝑑𝑡𝑟 {𝑝𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑌𝑐𝑡𝑟 + 𝑝𝑑𝑡𝑟𝑌𝑑𝑡𝑟} 
given that 𝑌𝑡𝑟 = (𝑌𝑐𝑡𝑟
𝜀−1
𝜀 + 𝑌𝑑𝑡𝑟
𝜀−1
𝜀   )
𝜀
𝜀−1, 
 
(44) 
𝑝𝑐𝑡𝑟
𝑝𝑑𝑡𝑟
= (
𝑌𝑐𝑡𝑟
𝑌𝑑𝑡𝑟
)
−
1
𝜀
 
 
Intermediates: 
(45) 𝑌𝑗𝑡𝑟 = 𝐿𝑗𝑡𝑟
1−𝛼 ∫ 𝐴𝑗𝑖𝑡
1−𝛼1
0
𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑟
𝛼  𝑑𝑖,        
 
(46) max𝐿𝑗𝑡𝑟,𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑟 {(𝑝𝑗𝑡𝑟 − 𝜏𝑗𝑡𝑟)𝐿𝑗𝑡𝑟
1−𝛼 ∫ 𝐴𝑗𝑖𝑡
1−𝛼1
0
𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑟
𝛼 𝑑𝑖 − 𝑤𝑡𝑟𝐿𝑗𝑡𝑟 −
∫ 𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡
1
0
𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑟 𝑑𝑖}, 
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(47) 𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑟 = (
(𝑝𝑗𝑡𝑟−𝜏𝑗𝑡𝑟)𝛼
𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡
)
1
1−𝛼
𝐿𝑗𝑡𝑟𝐴𝑗𝑖𝑡 . 
 
(48) 𝐿𝑐𝑡𝑟 + 𝐿𝑑𝑡𝑟 = 𝐿𝑟 ,  
 
Machine producers: 
(49) max𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡   {𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑟(𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡) − 𝜓(1 − 𝑠)𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑟(𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡)}, 
 
(50) 𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 
 𝜓 (1−s)
𝛼
 ,  
 
(51) 𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑟 = (
(𝑝𝑗𝑡𝑟−𝜏𝑗𝑡𝑟)
(1−s)
)
1
1−𝛼
𝐿𝑗𝑡𝑟𝐴𝑗𝑖𝑡 , 
 
(52) 𝜋𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑟 = (1 − 𝛼)𝛼
1−2𝛼
1−𝛼 (𝑝𝑗𝑡𝑟 − 𝜏𝑗𝑡𝑟)
1
1−𝛼𝐿𝑗𝑡𝑟𝐴𝑗𝑖𝑡 . 
 
(53) 𝜋𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 𝜋𝑗𝑖𝑡𝐸 + 𝜋𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑈 
= (1 − 𝛼)𝛼
1−2𝛼
1−𝛼 (𝑝𝑗𝑡𝐸 − 𝜏𝑗𝑡𝐸)
1
1−𝛼𝐿𝑗𝑡𝐸𝐴𝑗𝑖𝑡 + (1 − 𝛼)𝛼
1−2𝛼
1−𝛼 (𝑝𝑗𝑡𝑈)
1
1−𝛼𝐿𝑗𝑡𝑈𝐴𝑗𝑖𝑡  
= (1 − 𝛼)𝛼
1−2𝛼
1−𝛼 𝐴𝑗𝑖𝑡 [(𝑝𝑗𝑡𝐸 − 𝜏𝑗𝑡𝐸)
1
1−𝛼𝐿𝑗𝑡𝐸 + (𝑝𝑗𝑡𝑈)
1
1−𝛼𝐿𝑗𝑡𝑈]  
 
Innovations:  
(54) 𝐴𝑗𝑡 ≡ ∫ 𝐴𝑗𝑖𝑡
1
0
𝑑𝑖, 
 
(55) 𝐴𝑗𝑡 = (1 + 𝛾𝜂𝑗𝑠𝑗𝑡)𝐴𝑗𝑡−1, 
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(56) Π𝑗𝑡𝑟 = 𝜂𝑗(1 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝛼)𝛼
1−2𝛼
1−𝛼 (𝑝𝑗𝑡𝑟 − 𝜏𝑗𝑡𝑟)
1
1−𝛼𝐿𝑗𝑡𝑟𝐴𝑗𝑡−1. 
 
(57) Π𝑗𝑡 = Π𝑗𝑡𝐸 +  Π𝑗𝑡𝑈 = 𝜂𝑗(1 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝛼)𝛼
1−2𝛼
1−𝛼 (𝑝𝑗𝑡𝐸 − 𝜏𝑗𝑡𝐸)
1
1−𝛼𝐿𝑗𝑡𝐸𝐴𝑗𝑡−1 
+ 𝜂𝑗(1 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝛼)𝛼
1−2𝛼
1−𝛼 (𝑝𝑗𝑡𝑈)
1
1−𝛼𝐿𝑗𝑡𝑈𝐴𝑗𝑡−1 
= 𝜂𝑗(1 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝛼)𝛼
1−2𝛼
1−𝛼 𝐴𝑗𝑡−1 [(𝑝𝑗𝑡𝐸 − 𝜏𝑗𝑡𝐸)
1
1−𝛼𝐿𝑗𝑡𝐸 + (𝑝𝑗𝑡𝑈)
1
1−𝛼𝐿𝑗𝑡𝑈] 
 
(58) 
Π𝑐𝑡
Π𝑑𝑡
=
𝜂𝑐
𝜂𝑑
 ×
𝐴𝑐𝑡−1
𝐴𝑑𝑡−1⏟
𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡
× 
  { [ (
𝑝𝑐𝑡𝐸
𝑝𝑑𝑡𝐸 − 𝜏𝑑𝑡𝐸
)
1
1−𝛼
 
⏟          
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶
×
𝐿𝑐𝑡𝐸
𝐿𝑑𝑡𝐸
 
⏟
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶
]
+ [ (
𝑝𝑐𝑡𝑈
𝑝𝑑𝑡𝑈
)
1
1−𝛼
 
⏟      
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑
×
𝐿𝑐𝑡𝑈
𝐿𝑑𝑡𝑈
 
⏟
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑
] }  
 
(59) 𝑠𝑐𝑡 + 𝑠𝑑𝑡 ≤ 1, 
 
With a subsidy from Environmental Concerned: 
(60) Π𝑐𝑡 = 𝜂𝑐(1 + 𝛾)(1 − 𝛼)𝛼
1−2𝛼
1−𝛼 𝐴𝑐𝑡−1 [(1 + 𝑞𝑡𝐸)(𝑝𝑐𝑡𝐸)
1
1−𝛼𝐿𝑐𝑡𝐸 + (𝑝𝑐𝑡𝑈)
1
1−𝛼𝐿𝑐𝑡𝑈] 
 
 
Consumption and the environment: 
(61) 𝐶𝑡𝑟 = 𝑌𝑡𝑟 − 𝜓 (∫ 𝑥𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑟
1
0
𝑑𝑖 + ∫ 𝑥𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑟  𝑑𝑖 
1
0
), 
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Environmental Concerned: 
(62) ∑
1
(1+𝜌)𝑡
∞
𝑡=0  𝑢𝐸(𝐶𝑡𝐸 , 𝑆𝑡), 
 
(63)  𝑙𝑖𝑚𝐶↓0
𝜕𝑢(𝐶,𝑆)
𝜕𝐶
=  ∞,     𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑆↓0
𝜕𝑢(𝐶,𝑆)
𝜕𝑆
=  ∞,     𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑆↓0 𝑢(𝐶, 𝑆) = −∞, 
 
(64) 
𝜕𝑢(𝐶,𝑆)
𝜕𝑆
= 0, 
 
 Unconcerned: 
(65) ∑
1
(1+𝜌)𝑡
∞
𝑡=0  𝑢𝑈(𝐶𝑡𝑈), 
 
Global pollution: 
(66) 𝑆𝑡+1 = −𝜉(𝑌𝑑𝑡𝐸 + 𝑌𝑑𝑡𝑈) + (1 + 𝛿)𝑆𝑡, 
 
